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I. Introduction 
For more than five decades, economists and policy makers have observed and researched growing 
disparities in job opportunities and earnings among working families and have proposed strategies to 
improve job and earnings prospects for those at the bottom and middle of the earnings distribution.  The 
disparities also have a spatial dimension in that some states and regions of the United States grow, while 
others lag, with corresponding job opportunities in growing and lagging regions.  However, even within 
states that enjoy relative prosperity, the gains from job creation occur disproportionately, as high-wage 
jobs grow only in some areas of thriving states.  There are growing earnings and job disparities among 
states; among different areas within states; and between residents who work in high-wage occupations 
and in less-skilled jobs within the thriving areas of states. 
The paper first discusses growth disparities among regions of the United States and the reasons they have 
widened in recent decades.  It then turns to growth disparities within regions and MSAs. Federal and state 
governments have addressed economic development in areas through place subsidies that utilize a variety 
of tax forgiveness, as well as wage subsidies. Sections three through seven of the paper review the types 
of subsidy policies directed at economic development of particular places and assesses their 
effectiveness. Section eight addresses the empirical evidence on State Enterprise Zones (EZ), Federal 
Employment Zones, and related programs. 
The last two sections focus on job training and other policies that assist lower-skilled workers find 
employment.  Wage subsidies help low-skilled workers with job placement.  These sections also discuss 
preparing youth for future employment using ongoing research on income and social mobility through 
improving conditions in neighborhoods for children as well as high-quality preschool education programs 
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for children.  People-based policies that build human capital in children need greater priority, and to the 
extent possible, they need to be differentially directed toward children in distressed areas.   
II. Interregional Convergence and then Disparities  
Rather than regional divergence, the economics and regional science literatures in the 1970s and 1980s 
focused on the evident income convergence among states and regions, as predicted under conditions of 
factor mobility by interregional trade models, and that are inspired by international trade theories.  Barro, 
as well as Barro and Sala-i-Martin, confirm income convergence at an annual rate of 1.8 percent among 
states during the 1880 to 1980 period.1  Carlino and Mills (1996) validate a convergence trend among 
states into the 1990s, while noting a brief divergence from trend in the 1980s.2 During these periods of 
regional convergence within the U.S., less skilled workers migrated from low-wage regions to high-wage 
regions.  The population movement increased average wages in lower-than-national-average wage regions 
and reduced average wages in higher-than-national-average wage regions. The interregional migrants 
earned higher real incomes in their new regional locations.  The movement of labor and population across 
states and regions led to regional convergence in incomes and wages, as well as workers’ skills. 
 Even during the period of interregional convergence, some regions of the United States − Appalachia, for 
example − lagged.  In addition, economists and policymakers cautioned as early as the late 1950s and 
early 1960s that regions with their employment concentrated in a few industries were subject to 
downturns or longer-term stagnation, because they were vulnerable to economic forces that could change 
                                                                        
1 Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1991. “Convergence across States and Regions.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity. Vol. 1: 107-182. Barro, R., & Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1992. Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, 100(2), 223-
251. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138606. 
2 Carlino, Gerald and Leonard Mills. 1996. “Convergence and the U.S. States: A Time-Series Analysis.” Journal of Regional 
Science. 36: 597-616. 
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demand for their products and/or workers. 3 Such forces include adoption of substitute intermediate 
goods that change demand for products – the use of more cement instead of steel in lower rise buildings. 
For example, changes in production technologies (automation), or competition from other regions or 
countries. A diverse regional economy less tied to a few industries or plants acted as insurance against a 
national or regional decline in any particular industry. 
Starting in the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s and beyond, automation affected job growth, wages, 
and regional convergence.  Acemoglu and Restrepo, in a series of papers, show the effects of automation 
on workers’ by their occupations, education levels, sex, and region of residence in the U.S.4.  They estimate 
that automation has had its largest effects in automotive, plastics and chemicals, and metal product 
industries, affecting about one-third of manufacturing employment and about 3 percent of total private 
employment, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.5 Technological change has affected jobs 
held by males more than females, especially males with education levels that range from less than high 
school to some college, but no degree.  On the other hand, job creation has occurred in higher wage jobs 
in knowledge industries that require college degrees, as well as in low-wage service jobs. 
Globalization, in the forms of offshoring and trade in goods and services, also affected jobs with its largest 
effects in the first decade of the 21st century. Autor, Dorn, and Hansen examine the effects that 
                                                                        
3 Chinitz, Benjamin. 1961."Contrasts in Agglomerations: New York and Pittsburgh" American. Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings 2 (May): 279 – 289. 
4 Acemoglu, Daron and Pascual Restrepo.  “Robots and Jobs: Evidence from the U.S. Labor Market.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 23285, March, 2017. There are negative employment and wages effects on workers 
in automobile manufacturing, electronics, metal products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastic, food, glass and ceramics and 
negative but smaller effects in construction, business services, wholesale, services and retail.  A few sectors show modest gains 
in employment, including finance, public sector, manufacturing areas that include recycling, basic metals, textiles, paper, 
furniture, and transportation equipment other than automobiles.  See also, Autor, David. 2010. “Polarization of Job Market 
Opportunities in the U.S. Labor Market: Implications for Employment and Earnings.” Center for American Progress, The 
Hamilton Project, an economics policy initiative of the Brookings Institution. https://economics.mit.edu/files/5554. 
5 See https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm 
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competition from imports have had on the U.S. labor market, especially after 2000.6  Autor, Dorn, and 
Hansen succinctly summarize the effects of both automation and globalization on workers and jobs.7  
“Concurrent with the rapid growth of US imports from China, the effect of trade competition on the 
manufacturing sector has become stronger over time, while the effects of technological change on 
employment composition in the manufacturing sector has subsided. 
Conversely, the impact of technology on jobs in the non-manufacturing sector is growing, as technological 
change seems to be shifting from automation of production in manufacturing, to computerization of 
(routine) information processing in knowledge-intensive industries.” (p 644) Given the above trends, the 
composition of job growth can be expected to continue toward high-skill, high-wage jobs in non-
manufacturing sectors, as well as toward jobs in personal services that traditionally have had lower wages. 
The growth in high-skill jobs has significant spatial/ regional implications. Skilled jobs in particular cluster 
due to agglomeration economies, and have concentrated in areas along the west and east coasts of the 
United States.8 On the other hand, globalization and technological change have reduced job growth in the 
                                                                        
6 Autor, David H. and David Dorn. 2013. “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market.” 
American Economic Review. 103 (5): 1553-97. Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hansen. 2013. “The China 
Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review. 103(6): 
2121-68.  
7 Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hansen. 2015. “Untangling Trade and Technology: Evidence from Local Labor 
Markets,” Economic Journal. 125(584): 621-646. 
8 Marshall emphasized the importance of agglomeration economies, and Jane Jacobs called attention to knowledge spillovers 
in urban areas.  See Marshall, Alfred 1920. Principles of Economics. London MacMillan and Jacobs, Jane. 1969. The Economy 
of Cities. New York Vintage. There is a large empirical literature that shows the productivity implications when manufacturing 
firms cluster.  See Rosenthal, Stuart S. and William C. Strange. 2001. “The Determinants of Agglomeration.” Journal of Urban 
Economics. 50: 191-229. Rosenthal Stuart S. and William C. Strange. 2003. “Geography, Industrial Organization, and 
Agglomeration.”  The Review of Economics and Statistics. 50(2): 377-393. Glaeser and Mare place agglomeration in the 
context of cities. See Glaeser, Edward and David C. Maré. 2001. “Cities and Skills.” Journal of Labor Economics, 19 (2): 316–
342. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/319563.  Buzard et al. show the clustering of research and development 
firms in chemical, electronics and other knowledge industries along the east and west coasts.  See Buzard, Kristy, Gerald A 
Carlino, Robert M. Hunt, Jake K. Carr and Tony E. Smith. 2017. “The Agglomeration of American R&D Labs.” Journal of Urban 
Economics. 101: 14-26. 
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regions between the two coasts, and has had especially large effects on jobs in the region that is east of the 
Mississippi River and west of the Eastern corridor that runs from Boston to Washington, D.C.9 
Around the same time as technological change and globalization began to influence jobs and change 
regional advantages, migration of low-wage workers declined, while high-wage workers in knowledge 
industries continued to move to major cities.10 Lin finds evidence that workers with more education adapt 
more readily to “new work” or knowledge work in occupations that require adoption and use of newer 
technologies.11  
III. Regional Agglomeration, Productivity, and Migration Slowdown 
Alfred Marshall theorized that industry agglomeration increased productivity, and Jane Jacobs added that 
agglomeration of people in larger cities increased worker productivity through general knowledge 
transfers among workers. A number of studies have verified that real wages are higher and continue to 
increase in large cities and especially in knowledge-producing occupations.12  
While agglomeration economies increase productivity and wages among knowledge workers, zoning and 
other building regulations in many cities have limited the supply elasticity of housing. Consequently, the 
real prices of housing in knowledge cities and regions have increased, and knowledge workers’ wages have 
outpaced the price of housing. As a result, knowledge workers’ welfare increases when they move to larger 
                                                                        
9 Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2018. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st 
Century America.”  Brookings Papers on Economics Activity. Spring pp. 151-255. See page 157.  
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/saving-the-heartland-place-based-policies-in-21st-century-america/  
10 Ganong, Peter and Daniel Shoag. 2017. “Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?” Journal of Urban 
Economics. 102: 76-90.  
11 Lin Jeffrey. 2011. “Technological Adaptation, Cities and New Work.” Review of Economics and Statistics. 93(2):544-574. 
12 Autor, David. Richard T. Ely Lecture, “Work of the Past, Work of the Future.” Richard T. Ely Lecture American Economic 
Association: Papers and Proceeding, May 2019, 109(5), 1–32. https://www.aeaweb.org/webcasts/2019/aea-ely-lecture-
work-of-the-past-work-of-the-future or http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor/video 
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cities.  On the other hand, the real wages of workers outside of the knowledge industries do not keep pace 
with housing costs in knowledge cities. 
Autor has recently demonstrated the above trends, showing that real wages of knowledge workers 
increase when they move to large cities that have knowledge-based industries and that generally lie along 
the east and west coasts of the United States.  Further, he charts real wages of less-skilled workers against 
city sizes in each of the years 1970, 1980, 2000, and 2015.  Real wages of less-skilled workers increase 
with city size in 1970, 1980, and 2000, although the real wage premium earned in larger cities versus 
smaller cities shrinks over the period. By 2015, the real wage premium for less-skilled workers in larger 
versus smaller cities has almost disappeared due to continued increases in housing costs in large cities.  
Low-skilled workers no longer improve their real wages and welfare by migrating to larger and growing 
cities once housing costs are taken into account.13 
Ganong and Shoag show in fact that migration of low-skilled workers has dramatically slowed down, 
because their real wages do not increase when they move to knowledge-based cities.  As a result, income 
convergence among regions has ceased.  Further, they show that places with more restrictive land use 
regulations have had the largest increase in housing prices and the slowest in-migration rates among 
workers not in knowledge-based industries.14 
Their specific empirical evidence reveals that intercountry migration (number of movers divided by 
county population) that stood at 7 percent in 1950, declined gradually to 6 percent into the early 2000s.  
                                                                        
13 Autor, David. Ibid.   
14 Ganong, Peter and Daniel Shoag. 2017. “Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?” Journal of Urban 
Economics. 102: 76-90.  They note that places with less restrictive zoning continue to exhibit income convergence with other 
places. 
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After 2008, inter-county migration rates declined more quickly and reached 3.7 percent in 2015.  Intra-
county migration rates experienced a similar slowdown, declining steadily from 13 percent in 1950 to 
about 10 percent in mid 1990s, and decreasing to 7 percent by 2015.  With little reason to migrate, less 
skilled workers have remained in places that suffer job losses from technology and globalization forces, 
while high skilled workers have moved to, and have concentrated in, knowledge-based and growing 
areas.15 
IV. Intraregional Disparities within Thriving Regions 
Coastal regions have benefited from the growth acceleration in knowledge industries – finance; other 
business services; electronics; chemicals, including pharmaceuticals; measuring, analyzing, and control 
devices; among a few others.16 While these regions and their mega-cities thrive overall, they have 
substantial numbers of residents who do not participate in the high wage jobs.  Autor’s findings on wage 
polarization patterns is particularly evident in thriving cities and regions, where substantial percentages of 
people work, and yet, live at or near poverty income levels.  In New York City, for example, the five-county 
poverty rate stands at 14.2 percent of households, but poverty rates in three of the five counties that 
comprise New York City stand at 28.6 percent in Bronx, 20.6 percent in Kings (Brooklyn), and 17.2 
                                                                        
15 Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2018. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st 
Century America.”  Brookings Papers on Economics Activity. Spring pp. 151-255. See page 157. 
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/saving-the-heartland-place-based-policies-in-21st-century-america/ A report 
from McKinsey Global Institute presents updated migration figures with no change in trend.  McKinsey Global Institute. 2019. 
“The Future of Work in America: People and Places, Today and Tomorrow.” 
16 Buzard, Kristy, Gerald A Carlino, Robert M. Hunt, Jake K. Carr and Tony E. Smith. 2017. “The Agglomeration of American 
R&D Labs.” Journal of Urban Economics. 101: 14-26. 
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percent in Manhattan.17 Moreover, children living in households that are below or barely above poverty 
levels have lower probabilities for income and social mobility.18  
Governments have enacted policies to address poverty, educational opportunities, and jobs for low-
income households in cities for 50 or more years. Some programs direct benefits to individuals and 
households.  A number of other programs attempt to support economic activity in specific places through 
subsidies to housing, businesses, or other entries located within particular areas.  These place subsidy 
programs attempt to improve economic conditions in specially designated locales, and thereby attempt 
to improve economic outcomes for individuals who reside in these places.  
V. Pros and cons of Place Subsidies 
Economists have generally argued against place-based subsidies that direct funds to businesses and/or 
infrastructure, and instead favor allocating aid directly to people.  A principal objection to place-based 
subsidies is that place subsidies direct funds to less productive or lagging regions, thereby reinforcing 
inefficient location patterns and reducing national income. Put another way, the same money spent in 
growing areas could produce greater productivity, more employment, and higher national income.19  
Nonetheless, various policies have directed place subsidies to both large regional areas and small areas 
within regions.  In the latter case, the subsidies direct funds to areas within central cities that have few 
employers, low employment participation, and /or high unemployment among their residents. 
                                                                        
17 Data on poverty from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Small Area Income and Poverty Program Estimates. 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/saipe.html 
18 Chetty, Raj, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. “The Fading American 
Dream: Trends in Income Mobility since 1940.” Science  28 Apr 2017: Vol. 356, Issue 6336, pp. 398-406 DOI: 
10.1126/science.aal4617  
19 A classic reference is Noll, Roger G. and Andrew Zimbalist. 1997. Sports, Jobs and Taxes.  Washington, D.C. The Brookings 
Institution. 
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On the other hand, place subsidies could induce greater area economic efficiency if they compensate for 
negative externalities and or increase productivity by inducing agglomeration economies.  Kahn (2012) 
has advanced an equity rationale to justify place subsidies.20 He notes that differences in development 
levels among regions can become untenable based on cultural or national norms, and policy makers use 
place subsidies with the intention of boosting development in places, even if there are higher returns for 
alternative uses of the funds. 
For large regions, governments have supported infrastructure investments – canals, railroads, highways, 
for example – that undergird regional development efforts. Other programs attempt to foster 
development in smaller distressed areas within cities using subsidies to industries, typically through tax 
forgiveness programs.  However, the rationales behind particular place-subsidy programs are often 
elusive.  Specifically, the intended beneficiaries by income group or other socio-economic characteristics 
are vague, and because intended beneficiaries and outcomes lack clear definition, the programs’ 
effectiveness are difficult to measure. 
Justifying place subsidies at an abstract level begs questions about the effectiveness of place subsidies in 
providing local employment, the amount of investment it might take to have measurable effects on 
economic outcomes, the benefits and costs of the investments in the local areas, as well as whether the 
outcomes increase national output. Nonetheless, Kahn has identified equity grounds as a key reason that 
policy makers fund place subsidies, and for that reason, place subsidies policies in one form or another are 
likely to continue. 
                                                                        
20 Kahn, Mathew E. 2012. “Cities, Economic Development, and the Role of Place-Based Policies: Prospects for Appalachia.” In 
Appalachian Legacy: Economic Opportunity After the War on Poverty. James P. Ziliak (Editor). Washington D.C. Brookings 
Institution Press: 149-168. 
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Place subsidies range from regionally based programs that target large areas that cross many states to 
those that target small areas in cities in attempts to boost employment among workers who live in specific 
places. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the President’s (Johnson) Appalachia Regional 
Commission (PARC) represent two large regionally based federal government efforts to foster 
development.  States and/or private investments in cities and regions are additional examples of regional 
development strategies. 
States and local governments have generally attempted to stimulate development in smaller depressed 
areas of cities.  They use state and local tax incentives directed at businesses and sometimes combine them 
with grants in aid directed at specific city areas that are designated as enterprise zones or similar names.  
The federal government recently introduced Federal Empowerment Zones (FEZ) that also target small, 
depressed areas within cities.  Business in these zones receive wage subsidies and tax incentives or tax 
forgiveness. 
Figure 1 provides a list of place subsidies along with their key features.  Studies that evaluate regional and 
city area place subsidies are discuss below.  Where research findings allow, programs’ effectiveness are 
reported. 
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Taxonomy of Place Subsidies 
  
Large Federal, State or Private 
Investments 
  
Programs Focus Areas Sources of Funds 
Tax 
Incentives 
Successful 
TVA 
Large regional 
area 
Federal No Yes 
PARC 
(Appalachia) 
Large number of 
county areas in 
13 different 
states 
Federal with input from states 
and localities 
No Somewhat 
Ben Franklin 
Technology-
Based 
Economic 
Partnership 
Four large 
regions covering  
State of PA 
State, local, private 
Includes 
local tax 
incentives 
but they 
do not 
drive the 
program 
Yes 
Employment 
gains occur 
largely in 
higher-wage 
industries and 
occupations 
Grand Rapids, 
MI (GR) 
Grand Rapids 
region 
Private funds. State location of 
MSU medical school in GR 
Not a 
main 
feature of 
the 
program 
Yes 
Albany, NY Nanotechnology 
State of NY and Private 
investment 
Yes.  Not 
a main 
feature of 
the 
program. 
Yes 
  
 
 
12 
 
Taxonomy of Place Subsidies (Continued) 
  
  Place Subsidies for Low-Income Areas of Cities   
  State Enterprise Zones   
Programs Focus Areas Sources of Funds 
Tax 
Incentives 
Successful 
State 
Enterprise 
Zones (EZ) 
40 states 
introduced 
EZs by 
2008.  State 
and local 
governments 
offer 
subsidies to 
businesses 
that locate in 
distressed 
areas of 
cities. 
Subsidies vary by state and include 
tax credits against state income 
taxes based on wages of employees; 
tax credits for capital investment; 
and property tax forgiveness.  Some 
states also reduce regulations and 
improve  city infrastructure 
Yes.  Most 
of the 
programs 
offer only 
tax 
subsidies 
Evidence is 
mixed.  States 
have moved 
away from EZ 
strategies. 
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Taxonomy of Place Subsidies (Continued) 
Source: Various publications and author summaries.  
Federal Zones 
Programs Focus Areas Sources of Funds Tax Incentives Successful 
Federal 
Empowerment 
Zones (FEZ) 
Small Areas (10 
sq. miles) of 
eight different 
cities 
Federal employer-
wage tax credit. 
$100 million block 
grant for business 
assistance, training, 
youth services, 
housing assistance. 
Yes.  Employers 
receive a 20% 
wage subsidy on 
the first $15,000 
of earnings for 
employees who 
live and work in 
the FEZ. 
 
Higher 
percentage for 
179 capital 
expensing 
allowance. 
 
Partial exclusion 
of capital gains on 
investments in 
FEZs. 
Mixed evidence of 
success. 
Federal 
Enterprise 
Communities 
(FEC) 
66 areas of cities 
that applied for 
but not awarded 
FEZs 
No block grant and 
less generous wage 
subsidies than FEZs. 
Yes. Employers 
receive wage 
subsidies. 
Evidence of success. 
Opportunity 
Zones (OZ) 
Provision of Tax 
Cut Job Act 
2017 (TCJA).  
Many zones 
designated.  Not 
restricted to the 
lowest income 
areas. 
Forgive investors’ 
capital gains taxes 
when gains invested 
in OZs for ten years 
or more. 
Yes. Potentially 
forgives all capital 
gains. 
Too recently 
implemented to 
have empirical 
evidence on 
effectiveness. 
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Klein and Moretti, Widner, and Ziliak in three separate studies have evaluated the economic effects of 
two large place subsidies, The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the President’s Appalachian 
Regional Commission (PARC).  TVA started in 1933 and continued until 1960.  TVA subsidies largely 
supported electricity-generating dams, flood control systems, and navigable canals.  A small portion of 
funds went to malaria control, educational programs, and health clinics.21  The scale of investment at its 
peak amounted annually to $750 per household in the region or about 10 percent of annual income for a 
typical household. 22 Klein and Moretti found the direct effects of the investment increased regional 
manufacturing productivity by 8.7 percent and increased household incomes in the TVA region.  When 
they also accounted for the agglomeration effects that TVA induced, TVA generated net benefits to the 
region as well as raised the productivity of manufacturing in the nation overall by 0.4 percent. 
Even with their positive results, Klein and Moretti caution that TVA investment may not uniquely affect 
national growth.  Similar investment elsewhere may have contributed more than 0.4 percent to the 
nation’s growth in manufacturing, for example.  Moreover, they note that the positive results may be 
specific to a time when manufacturing enjoyed robust growth in the U.S.  They suggest that their results 
may not scale to other regions nor apply in a new economy that relies on high-tech clusters and an 
educated workforce for job creation.23 
                                                                        
21 Moretti, Enrico. 2012. The New Geography of Jobs.  New York: Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt. pg. 200. 
22 Kline, Patrick and Enrico Moretti. 2014. “Local Economic Development, Agglomeration Economies and the Big Push: 100 
Years of Evidence from the Tennessee Valley Authority.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 129 (1): 275-331. 
23 Crisuolo et al. report employment effects of United Kingdom industrial policy between 1997 and 2004. The policy targeted 
high unemployment regions and subsidized capital in manufacturing firms located in the targeted regions.  Whether a subsidy 
to capital will create jobs depends on the output effects that the subsidy creates as well as the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor because the subsidy reduces the cost of capital relative to labor. They find that a 10 percent decrease in the 
price of capital increases jobs by 10 percent in small manufacturing enterprises (fewer than 50 employees), and no employment 
effects for larger manufacturing enterprises.  They also found no increase in total factor productivity. See Criscuolo, Chiara, 
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The President’s Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) started in 1965 as a long-term economic 
improvement program for a large swath of countries located in 13 different states – a region that spans a 
larger geographic area than the TVA.  Widner evaluated the program after 25 years of operation and Ziliak 
updated Widner’s work.24  Widner notes that PARC has three main functions.  It serves as a forum for 
ideas about economic development.  Each state, however, formulates a specific development strategy and 
proposes its own projects in line with its development strategy. PARC serves as a coordinating body to 
foster collaboration on projects among states in the region. 
Both Widner and Ziliak acknowledge that counties lying in Northern, Southern, and Central portions of 
Appalachia have different potentials for development.  Poverty rates also differ significantly among the 
three areas; residents of Central counties were worse off overall than Northern and Southern Appalachian 
counties’ residents.  
PARC’s major development theme centered on leveraging existing regional growth poles or taking 
advantage of the economic strengths in the cities and regions adjacent to Appalachian counties.  Another 
focus was creating job opportunities in industries unrelated to coal to diversify the economy, help job 
growth, and improve prospects for long-term development.  At the same time, some areas had few public 
services – local education, health, police, fire, hospitals, or streets. Limited amounts of federal, state, and 
local dollars were  invested in public services and human capital/development.  The bulk of the PARC 
money went to extending interstate highways to facilitate traffic flow through the region.  The aim here is 
                                                                        
Ralf Martin, Henry G. Overman, and John Van Reenen. 2019. "Some Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy." American 
Economic Review, 109 (1): 48-85.  
24 Widner, Ralph R. 1990. “Appalachian Development after 25 Years: An Assessment.” Economic Development Quarterly. 
4(4) (November): 291-312.  Ziliak, James P. 2012 “The Appalachian Regional Development Act and Economic Change.” 
Appalachian Legacy: Economic Opportunity after the War on Poverty.”  Ed. James P. Ziliak. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
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to ease transportation in and out of the Appalachian region that would in turn entice branch plant start-
ups from industries located in major cities (growth poles) bordering Appalachian counties.  The new 
highways would also provide opportunities for residents to commute to jobs in other areas. 
 Widner finds that during PARC’s first 25 years, southern Appalachian counties that border medium-sized 
metropolitan areas exhibited higher growth than counties in other areas of Appalachia.  He notes that 
during the same period, however, the southern region of the country in general experienced greater 
growth than other areas of the country, and the higher overall growth of the U.S. southern region 
contributed in part to southern Appalachia’s success relative to other areas of Appalachia.  Nonetheless, 
Widener concludes that the PARC development strategies played a significant role.   
In addition, PARC provided additional vocational training for residents of Appalachia. While the regional 
economy has not absorbed many of these trained workers and many leave the area, Widner suggests that 
the region made progress on many fronts, including health, education, and housing for residents.  He notes 
in conclusion that the quality of the work force will determine future local economic development.  
Populations in Appalachia have educational gaps when compared to populations outside Appalachia.  The 
educational gaps, he suggests, are similar to those between many low-income neighborhoods within cities 
and their more affluent intraregional neighbors. 
Ziliak applies econometric analysis to estimate the effects that PARC’s investments have had on poverty 
rates and per capita income growth in Appalachia between 1960 and 2000. Poverty rates fell in southern 
and central Appalachian counties. However, relative to poverty rates in other rural counties in America, 
they increased in northern counties. He also finds that infrastructure and transportation investments 
reduced poverty much more than the human development subsidies.   
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Per capita income grew faster during the 1960 to 2000 period in Appalachia than in other rural counties 
in America. Per capita income growth was uneven among Appalachian counties, however.  Those 
Appalachian counties adjacent to urban areas that lie just outside of Appalachia had slower per capita 
income growth rates than counties that lie outside of Appalachia and are adjacent to the same urban 
areas.25 Ziliak concludes that more investment is needed in the region, as well as a better understanding 
of the contributions various components of PARC make to poverty reduction and per capita income 
growth. 
VIII-1. Large Scale Place Investments by States and Private Investors 
States, private investors, and local governments have undertaken other targeted investments in efforts to 
turn around regional economies. Three major initiatives include areas that cover the State of Pennsylvania; 
Grand Rapids, Michigan; and Albany, New York. All attempt to recharge lagging regional economies. Each 
utilizes a different financial approach. 
The State of Pennsylvania, concerned about its fading industrial base, launched the Ben Franklin 
Technology-Based Economic Partnership (BFTP) in 1983. It divided the state into four regions – 
Pittsburgh and the western portion of the State, the Philadelphia area, University Park in the central swath 
of the State, and Lehigh Valley – former home of Bethlehem Steel – that lies in the eastern third of the state 
and north of the Philadelphia area.  
                                                                        
25 Ziliak notes that one previous study compared income growth in Appalachia to income growth in other rural counties in 
America and found income grew faster in Appalachia, while a second study compared income growth in Appalachia to income 
growth in counties bordering Appalachia and found income grew more slowly in Appalachia. Ziliak’s findings are consistent 
with the findings of the other two studies that used the two different comparison groups of counties.  See Isserman, Andrew 
and Terance Rephann. 1995. “The Effects of the Appalachian Regional Commission.” Journal of the American Planning 
Association. 61(3):345-365, and Glaeser, Edward, and Joshua Gottlieb. 2008. “The Economics of Place Making Policies.” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1 (Spring):155-253.   
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The State of Pennsylvania invested funds that it received from a 1998 tobacco settlement into regional 
life sciences initiatives, which amounts to $64 million per year for the ensuing 25 years.26 In 2002, 
Pennsylvania also funded a Greenhouse Life Sciences initiative, and invested $100 million in three 
locations, Pittsburgh, Central PA, and Southeastern PA, to support public/private partnerships 
(government, businesses, universities, and other partners).  Because each of the four regions had different 
initial strengths in technology-based industries and life sciences, each would leverage the investment 
funds differently.  As a result, the organizations formed, the types of jobs created, and the populations that 
benefit from the BFTP program differ among Pennsylvania’s four regions.  
For example, Lehigh Valley established the Lehigh Valley Development Committee (LVDC), comprised 
of leaders from business, government, financial, and university to guide development in the region.  The 
LVDC organization has a paid staff and is funded from a newly instituted local hotel tax. The LVDC plan 
aimed to establish an advanced manufacturing cluster in life sciences, build high-value business services, 
and capitalize on its extant food and beverage processing industry.  It also promoted life sciences research, 
entrepreneurship, and the establishment of new companies. 
To overcome the lack of venture capital in the region – a recurring issue in lagging cities and regions − the 
LVDC organized 16 area regional banks to provide startup loans to new companies.  LVDC also recruited 
new U.S. and international establishments.  The region also benefits from its population size, a technology 
oriented university in its center, and its proximity to the pharmaceutical and technology corridor that runs 
                                                                        
26 Act 77 State of Pennsylvania 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?yr=2001&sessInd=0&act=77 
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from Boston to Washington D.C.27 The region has built an advanced manufacturing base around medical 
activities and other industries, which provides employment for its residents. 
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have had significant life sciences in their universities and hospitals located in 
their respective regions. Pittsburgh, for example, continued to develop its medical center at The University 
of Pittsburgh, which is currently the largest employer in Pittsburgh followed by the University of 
Pittsburgh itself.  Pittsburgh also remains a major center for financial activities. Capitalizing on the 
strengths of Carnegie-Mellon University, the Pittsburgh economy has also had job growth in robotics, 
advanced manufacturing, and autonomous systems. High-wage and highly educated persons in these 
fields thrive in Pittsburgh.  The region has also retained major firms and attracted others − Alcoa, Bayer, 
Google, and Uber.  In addition, the region has developed a diversified energy production system.  It exports 
energy produced from coal, natural gas, nuclear, solar, and wind power – industries where workers require 
advanced skills but do not require advanced degrees. 
A drawback is that the region does not yet have the level of entrepreneurship to convert the innovations 
from research and development at its universities to downstream manufacturing and service jobs.  The 
high-tech transformation also has not created jobs for disadvantaged workers.  Pittsburgh city’s poverty 
rate stands at 23 percent.28   
                                                                        
27 Lehigh Valley Economic Council Annual Report 2017 “Come Here, Start here, Grow Here.” https://lehighvalley.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/LVEDC-2017-Annual-Report.pdf  
28 Andes, Scott, Mitch Horowitz, Ryan Helwig, and Bruce Katz. “Capturing the next economy: Pittsburgh's rise as a global 
innovation city.” Brookings Institution. September 2017 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/pittsburgh_full.pdf Similar results apply to the Philadelphia area.  
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Grand Rapids, MI29 
Grand Rapids City has 199,000 residents and its MSA has with 1.0 million residents.  The region has three 
major employment areas − Grand Rapids City being one of the three.  The region’s manufacturing sector, 
especially fabricated metals, was tied to the automobile industry, and its leading industry began to struggle 
as early as the 1980s, and declined rapidly between 2000 and 2005. 
Grand Rapids City business leaders anticipated the decline in Michigan’s automobile industries and 
foresaw a need for new development.  In 1991, a Grand Vision Committee formed which later became a 
Grand Action Committee for Grand Rapids City.  Several business leaders in Grand Rapids City owned 
closely held, locally based companies, including Amway, Steelcase Office Furniture, and Meijer Food.  
They provided the main impetus for implementing development plans. (The other two employment 
centers in the Grand Rapids region created their own development councils.) 
The leaders invested private funds, derived from their personal donations and from their foundations, in 
parks, convention centers, and other community infrastructure in Grand Rapids downtown and areas near 
downtown.  For example, Van Andel of Amway bought a downtown hotel and created the Amway Grand 
Plaza in an area around the renovated hotel.  The DeVos Family used its funds to establish a downtown 
campus of Grand Valley State University. 
To diversify the employment base, the group established the Medical Mile in downtown Grand Rapids. 
Van Andel invested $1 billion to establish the Andel Research Institute for biomedical research that 
opened in 2000.  The Grand Action Committee raised $20 million to match a Michigan State alumnus’ gift 
                                                                        
29 A Brookings report examines turnarounds in a number of locations and reports extensively on Grand Rapids. Atkins, Patricia, 
Pamela Blumenthal, Adrienne Edisis, Alex Friedhoff, Leah Curran, Lisa Lowry, Travis St. Clair, Howard Wial, and Harold 
Wolman.  “Responding to Manufacturing Job Loss: What Can Economic Development Policy Do?” Metropolitan Policy 
Program at Brookings Institution. June 2011. 
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to lure relocation of a significant portion of Michigan State University’s College of Human Medicine to 
Grand Rapids.  Spurred by the presence of the medical school and Andel Research Institute, Spectrum 
Health located to Grand Rapids City, and several manufacturing companies changed their operations to 
fabricate medical devices and other orthopedic products.  
Except for the location of a major portion of Michigan State’s College of Human Medicine, the Grand 
Rapids transformation occurred largely without state intervention or funding. Nonetheless, despite the 
large investments and high multipliers associated with high-wage employees in advanced manufacturing 
and medical facilities, the region’s revitalization has not benefited all residents.  The poverty rate among 
residents of Grand Rapids City hovers at 25 percent and stands at 11.6 percent in the MSA. 
Albany, NY30 
Albany, being a capital city, has a large state government work force.  The area also houses a large public 
university (SUNY Albany), a leading engineering school (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute), and IBM 
operated a large facility located between NYC and Albany.  Nonetheless, the Albany area began to 
experience economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s.  In the mid-1980s, Governor Mario Cuomo led 
efforts to attract nanotechnology to the region.  Regional leaders also established the Center for Economic 
Growth in 1987, funded with donations from large private companies, banks, trade unions, and 
universities.  In 1988, the Governor funded a graduate research initiative on advanced semiconductors at 
SUNY Albany.  Before he left office in 1994, he enhanced SUNY Albany’s strength in the sciences by 
funding new faculty hires and investments in research labs. 
                                                                        
30 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK158826/#ch7.s1 
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With the large NYS commitment to semiconductors, SEMATECH - a non-profit organization of semi-
conductor manufacturers that perform research − relocated from Austin, Texas to Albany, NY, followed 
by Tokyo Electronics.  In 2004, NYS, SEMATECH, and IBM contributed a total of about $500 million to 
establish a College of Nanotechnology at SUNY Albany.31  Tokyo Electronics contributed $200 million 
to the SUNY Albany Center for Excellence. 
The public-private investments attracted additional nanotechnology-manufacturing companies to the 
area to take advantage of knowledge spillovers/agglomeration economies associated with the 
innovations in nanotechnology occurring in the area. NYS continues to subsidize nanotechnology 
relocations in the area, including $1.2 billion in incentives to Global Foundries to build a semiconductor 
factory in Malta – a suburb located 20 miles north of Albany.  In addition, Hudson Valley Community 
College offers a 25-credit nanotechnology certificate to train students for entry-level positions in 
nanotechnology manufacturing. 
While nanotechnology is highly competitive globally, NYS has certain advantages, such as its stable 
geology necessary for chip manufacturing and a cluster of research and major manufacturing facilities.  
Semiconductor technology also has applications in biological areas, such as synthetic biology, human body 
implants, and biometric monitoring.  Expansion to more areas could further diversify the production lines 
and make the region less vulnerable to downturns in a single specialized industry. 
  
                                                                        
31 NYS invested $210 million; SEMATECH $40 million plus $120 million in kind; IBM $100 million. 
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VIII-2.  Lessons from Large-Scale Place Subsidies as Development Policies 
The foregoing big investment strategies have had success in growing regional economies, and in the latter 
three cases, transforming the regions from traditional manufacturing based economies to ones more 
concentrated in high-tech and advanced manufacturing.  Part of their successes may also be attributable 
to their region-wide emphases, (as opposed to focusing on a small area of a city) to their extant skilled 
work forces, and to population sizes of a million of more residents. 
The turnarounds have other common elements worth noting: 
1. The strategies require large investments, typically sustained over decades. For example, to 
increase a region’s GDP by 20 percent may require an investment of 200 percent of the region’s 
GDP, assuming a 10 percent rate of return on investment.  The financial investment and support 
has occurred for 20 or more years.  Given the amount of investment needed, this strategy may not 
easily scale to more than one area of a state. 
2. Larger regions have exhibited the most growth potential because these areas generally have 
human capital, universities, agglomeration economies, and cultural amenities, all of which regional 
strategies can leverage for higher returns on investment.  
3. Albany, Grand Rapids, and Pennsylvania have invested in growth industries that involve 
engineering, advanced manufacturing, life sciences, universities, or medical facilities, and often 
two or three from the above list.  They have targeted relatively high-wage, export-based activities 
that have high multipliers for local service jobs.  Either through community colleges or other 
curricula, the regions have invested in educating and sustaining skilled workforces. 
 
systems and other advanced manufacturing areas.32
 
4. Regions have implemented training customized to the local employers’ demand for workers who 
prepare themselves to work in better-paying technical positions in healthcare, information 
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  Training curricula require input from local 
employers who will hire trained individuals.33 
5. Successful places have formed organizations of leaders from business, government, universities, 
financial institutions, and other local organizations who invest financially in and commit personal 
service to the area.34 Regional financial institutions with appropriate government partnership can 
provide needed venture capital in areas that traditional venture capitalists avoid. 
6. Poverty persists in these regions, and growth in high-skilled jobs does not necessarily lead to 
employment of low-income residents and reduce poverty. Parallel programs of direct wage 
subsidies, and Earned Income Tax Credits are needed to employ lower-skilled workers. 
Investment in high-quality local education will prepare the youth in the region for future jobs.  
IX. Place Studies Targeted at Particular Companies or Locations. 
Federal, state, and local governments have enacted a number of initiatives to attract employers to low-
income areas of cities. In special cases, state and localities have engaged in megadeals – generous tax 
forgiveness programs and provisions for new infrastructure – to attract major employers. Businesses 
                                                                        
32 Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. “What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies?” Upjohn Institute Technical 
Report No. 18-035. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Page 99. 
https://doi.org/10.17848/tr18-035  
33 Studies show that employer-based job training programs can have had success, but employers have limited incentive to train 
workers when the skill transfer easily to other jobs outside the company or region.  See Heckman, James J. 1999. “Doing it Right: 
Job Training and Education,” The Public Interest, 135, Spring: 91-107. Employer incentives increase when workers accept 
lower wages during the training period. Job training offered in community colleges when customized to regional demand for 
employment using input from local employers has proven more effectives.  See evaluation of Project Quest program in San 
Antonio, Texas.. https://www.questsa.org/skills-training/ And Schwartz, Nelson D. 2019. “Job Training is a Shot at Prosperity 
for Texans.” NY Times. August 20. B1 and B4.  
34 Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. Op.cit. 
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typically drive the megadeals and choose their locations. Megadeals do not necessarily target specific 
locations in lagging areas within cities or lagging regional economies.  
IX-1. Megadeals 
Megadeals are by their nature sui generis in that they occur episodically; the subsidized plant/industry 
ranges from large manufacturing to major retailing; and the new plant generally chooses among generous 
offers from a number of states and localities. Government enticements generally include tax forgiveness, 
public expenditures on new infrastructure that supports the business, and/or workforce training.35  
Recent examples include large automobile manufacturing plants – BMW, Mercedes, Nissan −, and more 
recently, Hon Hai Precision Industry (FOXCONN), as well as a non-manufacturing location (Amazon).  
Economists and policy makers generally regard these subsidies as necessities, because local and state 
leaders want to win locations of large firms that promise large numbers of new jobs in a locality and state.  
However, analysts generally reason that the wages and job benefits the firms bring do not warrant the 
mega subsidies they receive from states and localities. In addition, the deals induce firms to choose 
locations based on fiscal incentives rather than the inherent productivity at various locations.  As such, a 
firm’s ultimate choice of a location may misalign with maximization of national productivity and output. 
On the other hand, firms may take advantage of the subsidies and locate in a place they would have chosen 
based on productivity considerations alone. In that case, the location optimizes national productivity.  
However, the tax revenues forgone in the megadeal introduce opportunity costs associated with tax 
                                                                        
35 Mattera, Philip, Kasia Tarczynska with Greg LeRoy. “Megadeals: The Largest Economic Development Subsidy Packages 
Ever Awarded by State and Local Governments in the United States.” June 2013 data updated to 2018 
https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/megadeals.  Firms that receive mega-deals sometimes make payment in lieu of taxes that may 
support public investments that benefit the firm or support local public expenditures.  
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reductions that extant businesses and people could have enjoyed had the tax concessions not occurred.  
With tax reductions, people could have had more funds to spend on private goods and/or chosen more 
local public goods. 
Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) identify another channel through which a new large plant 
location might warrant large state or local subsidies or tax forgiveness (megadeals).  In their empirical 
analysis, they find that extant plants in an area experience productivity gains when a new very large plant 
locates in their region.  Larger gains accrue to extant plants that share labor pools with and use similar 
technologies to the newly located plant.36  They do not measure the size of the productivity gains and 
therefore do not compare the productivity gains to the cost of the subsidies.  The main point of their paper 
is that such external economies exist. 
Not all megadeals produce sizeable or even positive external benefits – megadeals for large malls, for 
example.  The opportunistic and episodic nature of mega deals make them unreliable as economic 
development strategies.  Nonetheless, these “deals” may payoff locally when the new company produces 
export-based outputs, when deals draw investment and jobs to a region that otherwise would not have 
occurred, or yield agglomeration/productivity benefits to extant firms in the region. 
Overall, megadeals appear woven into state and local responses to location overtures of large 
firms/projects.  State and localities should evaluate carefully the direct, indirect, and spillover productivity 
benefits of the large firm in determining the extent of tax subsidies.  Ultimately, the deals may not drive 
                                                                        
36  Greenstone, Michael, Richard Hornbeck, and Enrico Moretti. 2010. “Identifying Agglomeration Spillovers: Evidence from 
Winners and Losers of Large Plant Openings.” Journal of Political Economy. 118 (3): 536 -598. 
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location choice, and instead provide economic rents. Or, if they do drive location choice, they, from a 
national perspective, may induce inefficient location choices. 
IX-2. Place Subsidies in Declining Areas of Cities.  
Despite economists’ reservations about the efficacy of place subsidies, governments have long used place 
subsidies in many forms. For example, public housing programs began in the 1930s in Atlanta, and in the 
1950s and ensuing decades, public housing, urban renewal, model cities, and other programs aimed to 
redevelop central cities.  Government place subsidies have evolved to tax breaks and other types of 
subsides available when employers locate in particular areas of cities or regions. The rationale behind place 
subsidies is to generate economic activity in selected areas to improve employment prospects of 
disadvantaged workers who reside in the areas. 
Spatial mismatch has shaped some thinking about place subsidies.  In the 1960s, John Kain found evidence 
of spatial mismatch or that employment opportunities declined for central city workers, especially for 
black, male (the language of that time) workers, as jobs decentralized from central cities to adjacent 
suburbs.  He concluded that segregation patterns in housing isolated African Americans from jobs that 
were leaving the city and moving to suburban locations.  Both access to information about the locations 
of job openings as well as the added cost of commuting from the city to suburban job locations reduced 
employment for African Americans residing in cities.37 
                                                                        
37 Kain, John F. 1968. “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 82(2): 175-197. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885893.  See also Kain, John F.  1992. “The Spatial 
Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later.” Housing Policy Debate. 3(2): 371-462. The research spawned a number of 
papers on housing values in central cities, with some research finding housing values lower in areas with concentrated number 
of African-American residents that might compensate for longer commutes to suburban jobs.  Follain, Jr. James R, and Stephen 
Malpezzi. 1981. “Another Look at Racial Differences in Housing Prices.” Urban Studies. 18: 195-203. 
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Kain and Persky argued against what they termed “ghetto gilding”; that is, place subsidies that provide 
jobs and other improvements in cities, because they ultimately reinforce existing economically inefficient 
residential patterns within cities.38  Instead, they advocated for a first-best approach that would open up 
housing opportunities for African Americans at suburban locations. More specifically, they recommended 
addressing discrimination against African-Americans in housing at suburban locations, including 
discriminatory practices in building, zoning, and lending.  With access to housing outside central cities 
areas, African Americans could live closer to jobs and have better access to employment. 
Ellwood, Ihlandfeldt and others in different papers began to question spatial mismatch and Kain’s initial 
findings.39  Their work did not lead them to support place subsidies, however.  More recently, Hellerstein, 
Neumark and McInerny have also challenged aspects of spatial mismatch.40  While acknowledging that 
spatial mismatch plays a role in joblessness among African American workers in cities, their study finds 
that the location of employers who hire African American workers is more important than spatial 
mismatch per se. 
More precisely, employers located in central city areas that are nearer African-American residential areas 
tend to hire white workers for all types of jobs.  In contrast, central city employers who hire African-
American workers tend to locate farther away from African American residential areas. As a result, African 
Americans work farther away from their residences than other races. Because of the above hiring patterns, 
                                                                        
38 Kain, John F. and Joseph J. Persky. 1969. “Alternatives to the Gilded Ghetto.” The Public Interest. 14: 74-91. 
39 Ellwood, David. 1986. “The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Are There Teenage Jobs Missing in the Ghetto?” In The Black 
Youth Employment Crisis.  Edited by Richard B. Freeman and Harry J. Holzer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp 147-
187. Ihlandfeldt, Keith. 1994. “The Spatial Mismatch between Jobs and Residential Locations Within Urban Areas,” Cityscape: 
A Journal of Policy Development and Research. 1(1): 219-243. 
40 Hellerstein, Judith K. David Neumark and Melissa McInerney. 2007. “Spatial Mismatch or Racial Mismatch?” NBER Working 
Paper Series.  Working Paper 13161 http://nber.org.papers/w13161 
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Hellerstein et al. suggest that placed-based policies motivated by the need to address spatial mismatch or 
bring jobs to specific areas of cities may not increase employment among African Americans or other 
groups, and may not address poverty reduction to the extent that the policy makers anticipate. 
Overall, the above literature questions whether programs that aim to attract new employers to depressed 
areas or foster business already in the area to expand and reduce unemployment in the depressed area. 
Even if the subsidies do create new jobs, they may not employ workers who live in the depressed area. I 
turn to a review of federal, state, and local programs that use tax and other incentives to create jobs. 
X. Tax Incentives as Tools for Development of Distressed Areas 
Fueled by thinking on supply-side economics, states created enterprise zones as early as the 1980s to 
attract manufacturing enterprises to distressed economic zones of cities to increase the number of jobs 
and wages in these areas. A reading of the empirical findings suggests more tax incentive programs have 
failed to deliver job creation than have succeeded.  Among the reasons is that new jobs in zone areas may 
displace jobs in other areas of the city when businesses relocate from outside the zone to inside the zone. 
Analysts therefore have observed that counting the total number of new jobs in an enterprise zone may 
overstate the total number of jobs created.  A related question is whether the jobs created benefit the zone 
residents, as the EZ program intends.41 Enterprise zone program evaluation should also account for the 
types of jobs created (ex. full or part-time), the duration of the jobs, and the level of wages.   
Capitalization of the program benefits into land prices, housing prices, and housing rents represent an 
unintended effect of enterprise zone policies.  Capitalization can occur when a program successfully 
                                                                        
41 Peters, Alan H., and Peter S. Fisher. 2002. State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have They Worked? Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9781417524433  
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attracts firms and/or households to the targeted area.  Residents may find their housing prices and rents 
increase in the area. Current homeowners gain, while renters who experience higher rents and who are 
employed prior to the enterprise zone program may see their real incomes decline.  The capitalization 
effects also apply to Federal Empowerment Zones that were adopted in the 1990s, and are considered in 
a later section of this paper. 
In summary, evaluation of tax incentives and other employment programs should include the number and 
types of jobs created − export-based jobs, and full or part-time jobs −, the duration of the jobs, and the 
workers who receive the jobs; that is, residents of the zone who were previously unemployed, for example.  
Evaluations also should measure the wages for the new jobs, poverty reduction in the area, and housing 
price capitalization or rent increases in the zone. Capitalization is of particular concern for programs that 
target a small urban area because housing supply is more inelastic in a smaller area there than it is for an 
entire region.  Housing prices and rents are more apt to increase in EZ areas. 
X-1. More Details on States’ Subsidies to Low-Income Areas of Cities 
As various times, 40 states have adopted EZ policies.  Tax reduction incentives for firms relocating or 
expanding in the targeted area represent a common dimension of EZ programs, although the types of 
taxes forgiven, and additional incentives provided vary considerably among states and programs.  For 
example, states and localities have reduced one or more taxes on inventories, property, corporate income 
business income, or sales for businesses that locate or expand their employment in the zone.  Existing 
businesses may qualify for the tax benefits whether they expand their employment, depending on the 
particular state program.  In some cases, EZ programs include grants-in-aid to improve social conditions in 
the targeted local area and/or make infrastructure improvements in the local area as well as the tax 
incentives. 
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Bartik collected data on the structure of the tax incentives offered in 33 states and 45 industries.  
Together, the 33 states comprise 92 percent of U.S. GDP, and the 45 industries in the 33 states comprise 
91 percent of U.S. labor compensation.42  His data do not only consider tax incentives for EZ programs.  
Rather, the data describe several business incentives, including local government property tax 
abatements, sales tax forgiveness on business inputs, tax credits against state businesses taxes for job 
creation, state or local customized job training, state abatements for corporate income taxes, and research 
and development tax credits. 
Property taxes and sales taxes on business inputs account for 57 percent of state and local tax incentives 
on business.  However, property tax abatements and sales tax relief on business inputs and inventories do 
not directly subsidize hiring more workers.  Instead, the incentives promote firm expansion and 
employment increases by increasing businesses’ profits.  On the other hand, if part of the incidence of 
property and sales taxes falls on capital, the incentives could reduce the cost of capital, and along with 
encouraging business expansions, may encourage substitution of capital for labor.43  Bartik further notes, 
that since 1990, states have shifted qualifications for tax incentives more directly to reward job creation. 
The following section reviews what we know about the effectiveness of state EZ programs, based on a 
selection of often-cited studies.  Early EZ programs aim to increase manufacturing jobs in the zone.  Some 
studies examine employment changes in the zone, while other studies get more granular and examine 
                                                                        
42 Bartik, Timothy J. 2017. “A New Panel Database on Business Incentives for Economic Development Offered by state and 
Local Governments in the United States.” Prepared for the Pew Charitable Trusts. http://research.upjohn.org/reports/225 
43 Papke and others make this point.  Papke, Leslie E. 1993. “What Do We Know about Enterprise Zones?” in Tax Policy and 
the Economy. Volume 7 J.M. Poterba, Ed., NBER MIT Press: 37-72. 
 
 
 
32 
 
employment changes among low-wage workers. Figure 2 contains a summary of each study that is 
reviewed in more detail below. 
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Figure 2 
Selected Studies of Place Subsidies for Areas of Cities 
  
Study/Authors Enterprise Zone Incentives and Places Analyzed Results 
Rubin and 
Richards 
(1992) 
Examined results for zones in United Kingdom (UK) and 
states in U.S.  
UK zones not found to generate jobs.  
Successful EZ program is states 
characterized by: areas that have 
potential for private development; 
have a significant portion of industrial 
and commercial activity; can support a 
professionally managed and active 
organization that establishes a public-
private partnership.   
Papke (1993) Examines early evidence on enterprise zones in states. 
Subsidies to capital induces 
substitution of capital for labor.  
Infrastructure deficiency or lack of 
trained labor discourage location more 
than a high cost of capital.  Labor 
subsidies create employment but do 
not necessarily increase workers’ 
wages. 
Papke (1994) 
Indiana EZ program grants relief from 100% of local 
property tax on business inventories and an employment 
tax credit for 10% of wages with max. credit of $1,500.  
Inventories increase and 
unemployment claims decrease in the 
10 Indiana zones in the 1980s.   
Boarnet and 
Bogart (1996) 
Tax credits against corporate income taxes if firm hires new 
full-time employees. Also, reduced sales taxes and 
reductions in unemployment insurance taxes.   
No effects on employment or property 
values at the municipal level in 
enterprise zones municipalities relative 
to municipalities eligible for enterprise 
zones but did not receive zone 
designation.   
Neumark and 
Kolko (2010) 
California EZ program provides tax credits for 50% of 
qualified wages (defined as 150% of minimum wage) for 
disadvantaged workers regardless of whether they live in 
the enterprise zone area, income tax credit for sales and use 
taxes on machinery purchases, accelerated depreciation, 
and income tax credits for workers who live and work in the 
zone.   
Enterprise zones in CA do not increase 
total employment in the enterprise 
zone and reduces the total number of 
businesses.  May indicate that 
businesses consolidate as number as 
fewer business employ the same 
number of employees.  Study also finds 
that the shares of jobs in low-wage 
manufacturing industries do not 
increase.  
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Selected Studies of place Subsidies for Areas of Cities (Continued) 
Source: Cited studies and author summaries. 
  
Study/Authors Federal Empowerment Zones Results 
Ham, Swenson, 
Imrohrorglu, 
and Song 
(2011) 
Simultaneously estimates effects of incentives associated 
with Enterprise Zones in CA, FL, MA, NY, OH, and OR 
created in the 1990s, as well as Federal Empowerments 
Zones and Enterprise Community Programs.  State zone 
benefits range from hiring incentives and state exemptions 
from payroll taxes to property tax abatements. 
Poverty and unemployment during the 
1990s reduced in state enterprise 
zones located in CA, MA, and NY.  
Finds significant reduction in poverty 
and unemployment and increased in 
wages and salary income and 
employment in Federal Empowerment 
Zones and Enterprise Community 
Programs. 
Busso, 
Gregory, and 
Kline (2013) 
Federal Empowerment Zones located in six large cities 
subsidize the employment of workers who live and work 
inside the zone.  In addition to the wage subsidy for these 
workers, zones also receive a substantial block grant for 
business assistance infrastructure, training programs, 
housing subsidies, and other physical developments.  The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development estimated 
that the federal tax credits and block grants stimulated as 
much as five times the their amounts in additional private 
investment in the zones. 
From 1992 to 2000, empowerment 
zone designation created jobs in zone 
areas for zone and non-zone residents.  
Earnings increased for local workers 
and they found increases in housing 
prices but not rents and not the cost of 
living for zone residents. Results did 
not reveal the relative importance of 
the wage credits, block grants, and 
private investment in jobs and earnings 
growth.  
Hanson  
(2009) 
Examines employment, poverty and median property 
values changes between 1990 and 2000 in census tracts 
with empowerment zones. 
Does not find empowerment ones 
created jobs or reduced poverty in 
empowerments zones.  He finds that 
median property values increased in 
the zones, which he infers is indirect 
evidence of increases in economic 
activity in empowerment zones.   
Hanson and 
Rohlin (2011) 
Examines changes (between 1994 and 1996 and between 
1994 and 2000) in shares of total city establishments and 
in shares of total city employment in census tracts with 
empowerment zones for each of seven industry categories, 
using Dun and Bradstreet Data. 
The wage tax credit increases 
establishment and employment shares 
in less capital-intensive industries – 
retail sales and service industries and 
decreases shares in transportation and 
in finance, insurance and real estate 
industries.   
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Selected Studies of Place Subsidies for Areas of Cities (Continued) 
Study/Authors Federal Empowerment Zones Results 
Reynolds and 
Rohlin (2015) 
Examines changes between 1990 and 2000 in 
the number of households in: nine separate 
income categories relative to the poverty line; 
13 separate income categories; 16 separate 
housing gross rent and housing value categories 
for 838 census blocks with empowerment zones 
and 3,658 census blocks in enterprise 
communities (applied for and did not receive 
empowerment zone status). Uses empowerment 
zones’ blocks as experimental group and 
enterprise communities’ blocks as a control 
group. 
Find increases in number of 
households with incomes twice 
the poverty rate, but 
households with incomes of 
$100,000 or more drive almost 
all of the increase.  Also, find 
increases in density of 
households with incomes less 
than ½ the poverty line.  Find 
increases in rents and housing 
values for high-cost housing in 
empowerment zones.  Overall, 
zone designation benefits 
higher income households, and 
increases the number of 
household in deep poverty. 
Source: Cited studies and author summaries.  
X-2. Evidence on Effectiveness of State Enterprise Zone Programs 
Initial EZ programs focused on property tax relief, sales tax abatements, reductions in unemployment 
insurance taxes, and accelerated depreciation on new equipment for state corporate income taxes. Papke 
conducted an early study that analyzed employment and other economic effects of Indiana’s EZ program.  
Indiana’s program at that time forgave property taxes on business inventories as well as provided 
employers with a wage tax credits equal to 10 percent of wages up to a $1,500 maximum for each zone 
resident hired.44  Using a quasi-experimental design and panel data for local tax jurisdictions – not 
enterprise zones per se – she compares employment and other outcomes for local tax jurisdictions that 
contain zones with the same outcomes for similar local tax jurisdictions that do not contain zones. 
                                                                        
44 Papke, Leslie E. 1994. “Tax Policy and Urban Development: Evidence from the Indiana Enterprise Zone Program.” Journal 
of Public Economics. 54: 37-49. 
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She finds that in local jurisdictions with zones, business inventories increased 8 percent, an expected result 
because property tax abatement on business inventories represents the most generous aspect of the 
enterprise zone tax incentive package.  In addition, the value of machinery and equipment declined, while 
local unemployment claims decreased.  With the limitation on available data, the study could not establish 
a direct link between employment of zone residents and wage tax credits, however. 
Boarnet and Bogart also apply quasi-experimental methods, similar to Papke’s, to examine the EZ effects 
for New Jersey’s program. 45 They examine employment and property value increases in New Jersey 
municipalities that received EZs compared to those municipalities with areas that qualified as EZs but 
were not designated as EZs.  
 In New Jersey, firms expanding in or relocating to the zone and hiring new full-time employees received 
tax credits against the state corporate income tax, reductions in sales taxes on business purchases, 
reductions in retail sales taxes, and reductions in unemployment insurance taxes.  They find no 
employment effects in municipalities with EZs compared to municipalities without zones, and no 
difference in property values between municipalities with zones and municipalities without zones. Due to 
data limitations, they also could not measure employment and property value effects for the EZ areas 
themselves. 
California has packaged a set of incentives for firms that locate or are located in specified zone areas and 
hire disadvantaged workers regardless of their residences.  Neumark and Kolko use a quasi-experimental 
design and compare employment changes in zone areas with employment changes in similar areas that do 
                                                                        
45 Boarnet, Marlon G. and William T Bogart. 1996. Enterprise Zones and Employment.” Journal of Urban Economics. 40(2): 
198-215. 
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not receive zone designations. 46,47  They use Dun and Bradstreet national longitudinal establishment files 
and measure changes in employment within zones and in their control areas during the 1992-2004 period.  
They also account in their analysis for federal programs, such as Enterprise Communities and 
Empowerment Zones that overlap the EZ zone areas during their measurement period. 
The most costly aspect of the California program is that it subsidizes establishments to hire 
“disadvantaged workers” without regard to their residences.  In addition, the program offers tax 
reductions for business sales taxes, accelerated depreciation, longer carry forward periods for losses on 
state corporate income taxes, and personal income tax credits to zone employees.  
Their study does not find evidence that establishments increase employment in EZs.  Because the subsidy 
to low-wage workers combined with the machinery/equipment depreciation allowances favor 
manufacturing establishments that hire low-wage workers, they also examine whether the share of lower-
wage manufacturing industries increase in the zones.  They find no evidence that the shares of lower-wage 
manufacturing industries increase. 
While Neumark and Kolko do not find evidence that the California EZ program increases employment of 
low-wage workers or total employment in the zones, they are careful to state that their results only apply 
to California, because zone programs in other states use different incentives. Nonetheless, as the results 
for the above studies illustrate, the prevailing evidence is that tax incentives have not had measurable 
                                                                        
46 Neumark, David and Jed Kolko. 2010. “Do Enterprise Zones Create Jobs? Evidence from California’s Enterprise Zone.” 
Journal of Urban Economics.  68: 1-19. 
47 They point out that previous studies suffer measurement error because, given available data, the studies could not use data 
for the EZ itself. Instead, studies have used data that measure variables for local taxing districts, census tracts, and 
municipalities to approximate EZs. 
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effects on employment or poverty reduction in EZs.  Perhaps because of the foregoing evidence, states 
have deemphasized EZ tax subsidies in recent years in favor of other types of place subsidies. 
X-3. Evidence on the Effectiveness of Federal Empowerment Zones 
The federal government in 1993 through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
designated eight urban communities in eight different cities as Federal Empowerments Zones (FEZs) that 
span on average 10 square miles in each city.  Employers in each FEZ received (for up to ten years) a tax 
credit of 20 percent on the first $15,000 of wages paid to each worker who both lives and works in the 
zone.  Employers in the zone also qualified for expanded expensing allowances for equipment purchases 
applied to their federal corporate income taxes; favorable treatment on capital gains from investments; 
and tax-exempt bond financing.  In addition, six urban local governments with FEZs each received a $100 
million block grant to fund one or more of business assistance, worker training, youth services, and/or 
housing assistance.  Three rural areas with zone designations received the same tax advantages as above 
and $40 million in block grants.  At the same time, the federal government designated Enterprise 
Communities (ECs) – 49 cities that applied for but did not receive FEZ designation.  ECs did not initially 
receive tax credits but received tax-exempt bond financing and each local government received $2.95 
million in block grants. 
Busso, Gregory and Kline use quasi-experimental techniques like those used in EZ studies to examine the 
employment, wage and housing price effects in FEZs compared to a control group of urban ECs.48  Most 
of the FEZs consist of contiguous groups of census tracts.  Accordingly, Busso et al. use confidential 
                                                                        
48 Busso, Matias, Jesse Gregory, and Patrick Kline. 2013. “Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent Placed Based 
Policy.” American Economic Review. 103(2): 897-947.  
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microdata from the Decennial Census, the Standard Statistical Establishment List, and the Longitudinal 
Business Database to construct a panel of employment, wages, and housing prices for households and 
establishments in each of the relevant census tracts. 
They find employment increases for FEZs relative to the control group. Further, larger firms (six or more 
employees) in the FEZs have increased employment more than firms with five or fewer employees.  Thus, 
there are both a larger number of firms with six or more employees and a greater number of employees in 
FEZs overall.  Weekly wages increase for workers who both live and work in the FEZ, but not for workers 
who work inside but reside outside the FEZ.  They also find that housing values have increased in the zones 
but that housing rents have not increased.  In summary, their evidence suggests that FEZ residents find 
jobs, have higher wages, and do not have higher rents that offset their wage gains. 
One caveat, however, is that the research cannot identify whether the employment and wage changes are 
due to tax incentives, wage subsidies, or block grants.  The exact mechanisms that lead to employment 
increases is subject to speculation; and leaves open the question of whether removing one element of the 
program – the block grant, for example – would lead to similar employment, wage and housing price results. 
Ham, Swenson, Imrohoroglu and Song have estimated effects of incentives associated with state EZs, 
FEZs, and federal ECs on unemployment rates, poverty rates, the fraction of households with wage and 
salary income, household average wage and salary income, and employment for residents of census tracts 
in designated zones using data for the 1980, 1990 and 2000 periods.49 
                                                                        
49 Ham, John C. Charles Swenson, Ayse Imrohoroglu and Heonjae Song. 2011. “Government Programs Can Improve Local 
Labor Markets: Evidence from State Enterprise Zone, Federal Empowerment Zones, and Federal Enterprise Community.” 
Journal of Public Economics. 95: 779-797.   
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Ham et al. find that places with EZs experienced increases in wages and salaries, reduced poverty, and 
lowered unemployment on average for all the states and areas in their sample, although the strength of the 
results are heterogeneous among states and areas. For example, FEZs have had larger effects in California 
and Massachusetts for both of the estimators in their research, but in Florida, they find FEZ effects for 
only one of the two estimators. In addition, one of the two estimators reveals reductions in poverty and 
increases in the fractions of households with wage and salary income – not lower unemployment − for New 
York, Ohio, and Oregon. 
The subsidies to FEZs reduce unemployment and poverty in census tracts, increase wage and salary 
income, as well as employment.  ECs experience similar effects on unemployment and poverty reduction, 
as well as increases in average wages and employment. Because ECs have smaller subsidies than FEZs, one 
could speculate that the FEZ program could produce similar wage and employment outcomes with smaller 
subsidies. 
A caveat to the Ham et al. results is that census data record the employment of residents of a census tract 
regardless of whether they work in the census tract, but employers in FEZs receive wage subsidies only 
for workers who both live and work in the zone. Their use of data on residential employment may 
introduce measurement error in the programs’  employment effects.  In addition, the reduction in measured 
poverty may result from movement of higher-wage jobs and people to the zones. 
The next few papers offer contrary evidence on FEZ effectiveness.  In three different papers, Hanson; 
Hanson and Rohlin; and Reynolds and Rohlin examine the effects of FEZs on employment, housing prices 
and rents among different income groups who live in the FEZ.50 Hanson, using census tracts as 
                                                                        
50 Hanson, Andrew. 2009. “Local Employment, Poverty, and Property Values effects of Geographically-Targeted Tax 
Incentives: An Instrumental Variables Approach.”  Regional Science and Urban Economics. 39:721-731. Hanson, Andrew and 
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observations, finds that FEZ designations increase property values and have small employment and 
poverty reduction effects. The property value effects are robust for different estimation methods and 
those results suggest indirectly that economic activity has increased in FEZs, even though he does not find 
significant employment increases nor poverty reduction for residents. 
Hanson and Rohlin extend Hanson’s analysis using Dun and Bradstreet establishment data.  They reason 
that the wage tax credit benefits lower-wage, labor-intensive establishments more than less labor-
intensive establishments.  (The establishment data use place of work rather than place of residence to 
measure employment.) Their results confirm that FEZ designations alter the industry mix in the zone. That 
is, the shares of city employment in FEZs increase in the labor-intensive retail and service sectors, but they 
decrease in less labor-intensive transportation and finance, insurance and real estate sectors. Because 
employment increase in some industries and decreases in others, these findings may help explain the 
conflicting results among studies about whether FEZ policies increase total employment in the FEZ. 
In a third paper, Reynolds and Rohlin use census block data to examine which households in the income 
distribution gain from FEZs. They find that within FEZs the density of households whose incomes are 
below poverty increases; the density of households whose incomes exceed twice the poverty rate 
increases; and the density of households with incomes above $100,000 (in year 2000 dollars) increases. 
Moreover, the increase in the number of households with incomes above $100,000 explains almost all of 
increase in the density of households with incomes above twice the poverty level. 
                                                                        
Shawn Rohlin. 2011. “The Effect of Location-Based Tax Incentives on Establishment Location and Employment across 
Industry Sectors.” Public Finance Review.  39(2): 195-225.  Reynolds, C. Lockwood and Shawn Reynolds. 2015. “The Effects 
of Location-Based Tax Policies on the Distribution of Household Income: Evidence from the Federal Empowerment Zone 
Program.” Journal of Urban Economics. 88: 1-15. 
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They also find that housing values increase in FEZ areas that initially have higher housing values, and gross 
rents experience small increases in these same areas.  The increase in housing values is consistent with 
higher demand for owner-occupied housing among higher-income residents and the jobs created for that 
group.  Little or no increase in rental housing prices is consistent with little or no increase in demand for 
rental housing among lower-paid residents and workers for whom their evidence suggests FEZs do not 
help. 
To summarize the results of the above five papers, the evidence on the effectiveness of FEZs is mixed. The 
disaggregate results from the Reynolds and Rohlin paper offer a more fine-grained interpretation of FEZ 
policy effectiveness.  To the extent that FEZs or similar programs alter the economic landscape of areas, 
the program benefits may bypass lower-income residents and improve prospects for gentrification of the 
area.  One could use the findings in the last three papers to speculate that increases in retail and service 
establishments make the FEZs more attractive to higher income households who then move into the areas. 
X-4. Discussion of Tax Incentive Programs 
The literature reviewed here suggests that reducing taxes or eliminating them altogether has not proven 
an effective means to turn around regional economies or even smaller distressed areas that lie within 
otherwise economically thriving metropolitan areas.  Programs that feature wage subsidies in the form of 
tax credits to employers have higher probabilities for job creation, but studies do not uniformly find them 
effective. 
Using a relatively optimistic assumption of 1.5 for an elasticity of job growth with respect to wage 
reductions from subsidies and a job growth multiplier of 2.0, substantial wage subsidies can produce cost 
 
 
43 
 
effective job growth.51  However, Bartik suggests that, when manufacturing jobs are created in distressed 
zones, in-migrants to the zones receive 85 percent or more of the jobs created, or few extant residents of 
the zones get the jobs. 
Bartik makes another point about wage subsidies.  He notes that the methods of financing the wage 
subsidies can have a variety of secondary effects, such as reduced school spending or a range of other 
program cuts as well as opportunity costs if tax increases finance the subsidies. The net effects of wage 
subsidies may be even smaller once benefits forgone due to expenditure cuts or tax increases are 
considered. 
XI. Job Training 
Job training programs offer another path to employment for disadvantaged workers and to reemployment 
for displaced workers.  Program effects and their effectiveness can be measured in a number of ways, such 
as, outcomes that include employment or finding a job, the employment duration, and the earnings in the 
new positions compared to earnings in the previous employment.  Heckman, LaLonde and Smith review 
both the empirical methodologies used in studies of publicly funded job programs and report their 
effectiveness.  The programs they analyze include formal classroom training, wage and employment 
subsidies, subsidized and non-subsidized employer-provided training, and job search assistance.52  It 
should be mentioned that non-subsidized (by government) employer-provided training typically has more 
                                                                        
51 Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. “What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies?” Upjohn Institute Technical 
Report No.18-035. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Pp. 13-14. 
https://doi.org/10.17848/tr18-035 
52 Heckman, James J. Robert J. LaLonde, and Jeffrey A. Smith 1999. “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market 
Programs.” In Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics. Volume 3a. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Pp 
1865-2097. 
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spending associated with it than publicly funded training programs.  Researchers, however, typically do 
not have access to data to evaluate employer-provided job training. 
Their review reports findings from studies that use experimental and non-experimental methods to 
measure training programs’ effectiveness. The empirical results on the effects of job training on 
employment and other variables differ across studies and even differ across studies that analyze the same 
job programs.  Heckman et al. attribute the variation in results both to different degrees of selection bias 
for those opting into an experiment and to model misspecification. 
Moreover, because of data limitations, researchers generally cannot measure a key dimension of publicly 
funded job training effectiveness; namely, increases in workers’ hourly wages directly attributable to 
training programs.  Consequently, earnings (not hourly wages) and employment represent the most 
common outcome measure for U.S. programs.  Many studies also report findings on a variety of non-labor 
market outcomes, such as, the utilization of social assistance programs, more educational attainment, less 
criminality, and less teenage pregnancy. 
Lack of data also limits the calculation of the net social benefits of public training programs.  For example, 
while training costs are generally available, other costs associated with training, including the value of 
training participant’s leisure time, their forgone earnings, the deadweight loss from taxation to finance 
training programs, and the displacement effects if newly trained workers replace other workers, are not 
generally considered.53  (See Heckman et al. p. 2043-44.)  Heckman et al. also note that the cost of public 
training programs typically amounts to $1,000 per trainee (in 1999 dollars). Even with a return as high as 
10 percent on the training investment, participants might realize $100 increases in their earnings. Where 
                                                                        
53 For a discussion of displacement effects, see Davidson, Carl and Stephen Woodbury. 1993. “The Displacement Effect of 
Reemployment Bonus Programs.” Journal of Labor Economics. 11: 575-605. 
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researchers find positive effects from training programs, participants’ earnings increase commensurate 
with a 10 percent return on the investment in training.  One conclusion is that if the objective of U.S. policy 
is to increase participants’ earnings significantly, it needs to increase the amount it invests in training 
programs. 
Heckman et al. summarize the empirical results from job training studies.  After job training, earnings of 
women increase more than earnings of men, and adult workers gain more from training compared to 
younger, less-experienced workers.  Low-skilled populations do not benefit from classroom training or 
from on-the-job training.  Wage subsidies to employers improve employment and earnings of low-skilled 
workers.54  
Card, Kluve and Weber have updated the Heckman et al. review of active labor market policies in the 
United States and in 46 other countries.  A few countries operate most of the training programs; six 
countries among the 46 have 2/3s of the training programs.  Germany alone has 30 percent of the 
programs.55 Active labor market policies include training, job search assistance, subsidized employment, 
public sector employment and a variety of other programs.  Together, training, job search assistance, and 
subsidized employment account for over 75 percent of active labor market programs among the 46 
countries. 
Their cross-country meta-analysis of training programs’ effectiveness reveals that, on average, active 
labor market programs have small to no effects in the short-run; the effects become more positive in the 
                                                                        
54 Heckman et al. note that the U.S. spending as a percentage of GDP on publicly funded training programs ranks last among 
the OECD countries they examine. 
55 Card, David, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber. 2015. “What Works? A Meta-Analysis of Recent Active Labor Market 
Program Evaluations.” NBER Working Paper Series. Working Paper 21431. Card, David, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber. 
2010. “Active Labor Market Program Policy Evaluations.”  The Economic Journal. 120 548: F452-F477. 
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medium term (2 to 3 years); and get stronger in the longer run. Programs that build human capital have 
larger long-run effects on earnings and employment than job search and other programs. 
Program effectiveness varies by workers’ sex, age, employment experience, and skill levels. The effects of 
training programs are larger for females than for males and higher for long-term unemployed 
(experienced) workers.  Programs have no, or even negative, effects on employment for young workers 
and for older workers.  Low-skill or disadvantaged workers benefit most from job search assistance. All 
active labor market policies have larger effects during recessions. 
Their conclusions are similar to those that Heckman et al. draw for the U.S.  The magnitudes of the effects 
of training programs on increased earnings is proportional to the amount that different countries invest 
per training program participant.  In addition, matching an active-labor-market training policy to a 
particular type of worker – females, disadvantaged, and longer-term unemployed workers – enhances 
program benefits and their effectiveness. 
Bartik and others point to customized job training to help local economies reemploy displaced workers.  
Community colleges work with local employers to develop customized education programs that train a 
workforce for specific jobs in local industries.  The results from the job training literature suggest that 
customized training programs are most helpful for workers with experience or motivated younger 
workers, but probably not as useful to employ or increase the earnings of disadvantaged workers.56 Job 
search assistance – helping them to find jobs – and wage subsidies seem to be the most effective programs 
for disadvantaged workers.  
                                                                        
56 Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. “What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies?” Upjohn Institute Technical 
Report No.18-035. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Page 3. https://doi.org/10.17848/tr18-
035. 
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The Project Quest in San Antonio, Texas appears to have had success with training and job placement for 
disadvantaged workers. The program places trainees in community colleges where they learn skills needed 
for jobs in high demand – health care and nursing, information technology and other jobs in high demand in 
the San Antonio region.  The program also spends on average $11,000 per trainee (substantially more 
than typical), as well as pays half the tuition and provides help with housing rents and utilities where 
needed.57 The success of Project Quest reinforces Heckman’s message noted above.  Effective job 
training programs may require considerably more spending per participant than typical in publicly funded 
job training programs. 
XII. Improving Earnings and Employment for Low-Income Populations 
The skewed distribution of job growth into lower pay and higher pay jobs is likely to continue to reduce 
the percentage of jobs classified as middle wage. Workers displaced by technology have requested job 
training, advance notice of technological implementation by employers, and severance packages to 
mitigate displacement effects from technology.58 Enhanced job training programs along the lines that 
Bartik has recommended are needed for this group of workers. Job search programs can place 
disadvantaged workers in jobs where they may earn minimum or slightly above minimum wages. 
Preparing future workers for employment appears to require more than job training programs in 
adulthood.  A growing amount of research suggests that early intervention for children needs greater 
policy priority. 
                                                                        
57 Schwartz Nelson D. “Job Training Is a New Shot At Prosperity for Texans.” New York Times. August 20, 2019, B1 and B4.  
And https://questsa.org/ 
58 Frey, Carl Benedikt. 2019. “The High Cost of Impeding Automation.” Wall Street Journal Report: Technology. October 25. 
R1-R3.  See Sidebar: 2018 Members of the Culinary Union, R3. 
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Mounting evidence (Moving to Opportunity) supports the tenant that growing up in better 
neighborhoods enhances a child’s income and social mobility, as measured by their earnings and an array 
of social behaviors.59  Chetty and his coauthors have explored income and social mobility using different 
datasets and their work corroborates the evidence in the Moving to Opportunity experiment.60 The 
studies emphasize that the earlier a child is exposed to better neighborhoods, schools, and social 
frameworks the greater the income mobility and social outcomes.  Put another way, moving children as 
teens, even early teens, can lead to no effect or even negative effects on income and social mobility. 
On the other hand, it is not practical to move millions of children and their families to neighborhoods that 
afford them better opportunities. Chetty notes that we need to improve opportunities in current 
neighborhoods.  Katz and Krueger propose a few policies that likely would increase economic mobility 
among those in the lower portion of the income distribution.  Among the suggestions is universal preschool 
to help restore increasing educational attainment in successive generations, which they note has lagged 
since the 1980s.61 
Based on extensive empirical research, James Heckman has advocated preschool programs for children 
from disadvantaged backgrounds.  In a portion of his work, he has shown that programs such as head start 
and the Perry preschool program (discussed below) may increase cognitive test scores, and preschool 
programs have measurable effects on non-cognitive abilities, such as perseverance, self-control, 
                                                                        
59 Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren and Lawrence Katz. 2016. “The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: 
New Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment.” American Economic Review 106(4): 855-902.  
60 Chetty, Raj and Nathaniel Hendren 2018. “The Effects of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility I: Childhood 
Exposure Effects” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 133(3): 1107-1162.  And Chetty, Raj and Nathaniel Hendren. 2018. “The 
Effects of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility II: County Level Estimates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 133(3): 
1163-1228. 
61 Katz, Lawrence F. and Alan B. Krueger. 2017. “Documenting the Decline in U.S. Economic Mobility.” Science. 28 April: Vol. 
356, Issue 6336, pp. 382-383. DOI: 10.1126/science.aan3264 
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industriousness, sociability, time preference, and leadership – abilities and skills that employers value in 
their workers.  For example, Heckman et al. find that non-cognitive skills have large and statistically 
significant effects on hourly wages of both males and females at all levels of education, ranging from high 
school dropout through four-year college degree.62  Non-cognitive abilities and skills also explain a range 
of improved social behaviors. 
Stewart’s recent evidence suggests that better non-cognitive (soft) skills also increases median wages in 
STEM and non-STEM occupations.  Specifically, median wages are highest for workers with both high-
STEM skills and high soft skills, while workers with low-STEM skills but high soft skills have the second 
highest median wages.  Workers in occupations that require high-STEM and low soft skills rank third 
highest in median wages, and those workers in occupations that require neither STEM nor soft skills have 
the lowest median wages.63 
XII-1. More on PreSchool 
The Perry preschool project used a social experiment to measure the effects of preschool enrollment on 
the future incomes of disadvantaged children.  The experiment ran for five successive years from 1962 to 
1967 in Ypsilanti, Michigan.64  The treated group, followed until age 39, is more likely to graduate from 
high school, has higher employment rates and earnings, has lower rates of arrest, measures better on other 
                                                                        
62 Heckman, James J. Jora Stixrud, and Sergio Urzua 2006. “The Effects of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Abilities on Labor 
Market Outcomes and Social Behavior.” Journal of Labor Economics. 24: 411-482.  
63 Stewart, Fran. 2018. The STEM Dilemma: Skills That Matter to Regions. Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Press. Also Stewart, Fran. 
2018. STEM and the Local Economy: Do Regions Reap the Benefits of a STEM-Educated Workforce? W.E. Upjohn Institute 
Employment Research Newsletter January 25 (1): 1-4. 
64 Students in the treated group received 2.5 hours per day of classroom instruction plus 1.5 hours per week of teacher home 
visits.  Students in the control group received neither classroom instruction nor home visits from teachers. See Barnett, S., 
Belfield, C., Montie, J., Nores, M., Scheweihart, L., and Xiang, Z. “The High/Scope Perry Preschool Study Through Age Forty.” 
High/Scope Education Research foundation (2005), High/Scope Press. Web. 
http://www.highscope.org/file/Research/PerryProject/specialsummary_rev2011_02_2.pdf  and “The High/ Scope Perry 
Preschool Study.” Susanne M. Glasscock School of Continuing Studies, School of Literacy and Culture, Rice University. 
http://centerforeducation.rice.edu/slc/LS/PPP.html 
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social behaviors, as well as uses public assistance programs at a lower rate than the control (non-
preschool) group. 
Heckman and Karapakula have recently used refined statistical techniques on the Perry data to adjust 
better for randomization protocols needed for the small sample sizes in the Perry experiment. In addition, 
they tracked the experimental and control participants to the age of 55, and they find that the effects of 
preschool persist past age 39, and the treated group has better health, higher employment rates, better 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills, as well as better outcomes in the social areas mentioned above.  The 
treatment effects are particularly strong for males.  They conclude, “Improvements in childhood home 
environments and parental attachment appear to be an important source of the long-term benefits of the 
program.”65 
In a subsequent paper, Heckman and Karapakula measure whether there are external effects of the Perry 
preschool program on the siblings and progeny of the original Perry preschoolers.66  They find that the 
children of the original Perry preschoolers also have lower crime rates, higher education levels and higher 
employment rates compared to the children of the control group.  The effects are especially pronounced 
among male progeny.  They are careful to sort out confounding effects, such as the treated group living in 
better neighborhoods than the untreated group.  In fact, the neighborhoods, using standard measure of 
social environments, of the treated group are no better than and sometimes worse than the neighborhoods 
of the untreated group.  Preschool then, and not neighborhood effects, explain the observed positive 
outcomes for children of the treated group. 
                                                                        
65 Heckman, James J. and Ganesh Karapakula.  2019. “The Perry Preschoolers at Midlife: A Study in Design-Specific Inference.”  
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 25888 May. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25888 
66 Heckman, James J. and Ganesh Karapakula.  2019. Ibid.  
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They also find substantial positive effects on the siblings of the Perry participants, even though the siblings 
did not participate in the preschool.  Again, the effects are larger and more notable for male siblings. 
XIII. Summary and Conclusions 
Significant areas of the United States have lagged economically behind economies on either coast of the 
U.S., particularly the eastern heartland – a region east of Mississippi River and west of the east coast.  
Middle wage job losses in manufacturing industries have reduced well-being among a significant number 
of workers, especially workers in the eastern heartland.67  Labor migration from trailing to growing regions 
has in the past served to address job losses in certain regions.  The evidence from several studies shows 
that migration of low- and middle-wage workers has slowed considerably, because moving to growing 
areas often leaves these migrants worse off, as the cost of housing in growth areas offsets the wage gains 
they might realize in growth areas.  The slowdown in migration leaves many in declining regions where 
factories continue to close or relocate; globalization has already affected jobs; and technology appears to 
threaten more jobs.  The combination of migration slowdown and job losses in regions leads policymakers 
and researchers to think about subsidies to individuals tied to places and circumstances.68   
An extensive literature advocates customized job training - community colleges and employers 
cooperating to train workers for jobs that employers need - to retrain displaced workers for employment 
in new fields and with new employers.  By contrast, disadvantaged workers gain employment more 
through job search assistance and wage subsidies paid to employers than through training programs. 
                                                                        
67 Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2018. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st 
Century America.”  Brookings Papers on Economics Activity. Spring pp. 151-255. See page 157.  
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/saving-the-heartland-place-based-policies-in-21st-century-america/  
68 Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2018. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st 
Century America.”  Brookings Papers on Economics Activity. Spring pp. 151-255. See page 157.  
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/saving-the-heartland-place-based-policies-in-21st-century-america/ 
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In efforts to attract employers and jobs to inner-city areas, state and cities have relied on tax reductions in 
enterprise zone areas.  Based on many studies, those programs appear to have limited success.  To the 
extent that they attract new employers or encourage expansion of existing businesses, the employers tend 
to hire workers who live outside the targeted area.  These programs may in the end increase the economic 
rents of employers, and only marginally increase employment among disadvantaged or even among more 
educated, better-trained workers. 
Federal Empowerment Zones offer, among other things, wage subsidies to employers who hire workers 
who both live and work in the empowerment zone.  Busso et al. conclude that wage subsidies increase 
employment among workers who both reside and work in Federal Empowerment Zones, and Neumark 
encourages wage subsidies based on the residence of the individual.69  Other studies find that the Federal 
Empowerment Zones have had more limited effectiveness. 
To have meaningful effects on employment for disadvantaged workers, Phelps has suggested wage 
subsidies of up to 75 percent of employers’ cost for an unlimited amount of time for the lowest paid 
workers; the subsidy would phase out as wages increase, however.70  The size of the subsidy needed to 
expand the number employed will also depend on worker productivity, the types of jobs available, and the 
elasticity of demand for labor, among other factors.  There are concerns about stigmatization for workers 
                                                                        
69 Busso, Matias, Jesse Gregory, and Patrick Kline. 2013. “Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent Placed Based 
Policy.” American Economic Review. 103(2): 897-947.  Neumark, David. 2018. “Rebuilding Community Job Subsidies.” In Jay 
Shambaugh and Ryan Nunn (editors) Place-Based Policies for Shared Economic Growth.  Washington, D.C. Brookings Press 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ES_THP_PBP-book_20190425.pdf 
70 Phelps, Edmnd S. 1994. “Low-Wage Employment Subsidies versus the Welfare State.” American Economic Review, Papers 
and Proceedings. 84(2): 54-58. See also, Phelps, Edmund S. 1997. Rewarding Work. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. And Phelps, Edmund S. 2001. “Subsidize Wages.” In Philippe Van Parijs et al. (editors) What’s Wrong with a Free Lunch?  
Boston, MA: Beacon Press pp. 51-59.  
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with wage subsides, and employers would need to exercise discretion with information about the 
employees for whom the employer receives subsidies.71 
Moving to Opportunity and ensuing work of Chetty et al. has shown that children growing up in 
neighborhoods with improved social environments leads to higher chances of income and social mobility 
in their adult lives.  However impractical it is to move children to better neighborhoods, it is possible to 
improve the social environments of their own neighborhoods.  Addressing child poverty is known to 
benefit children later in life.72  Another valuable approach for children would place them in high-quality 
preschools, which have shown promise for development of their non-cognitive skills and cognitive skills.  
Evidence suggests preschool leads to more economic mobility and to better life outcomes that endure 
across generations. Programs, such as high-quality preschool, may increase national income. 
In addition to job training and preschool, Austin, Glaeser and Summers discuss the potential for 
differentially higher in-kind and earned-income-tax-credit (EITC) subsidies for households stuck in 
lagging economic regions.73  Others have noted, that in real dollars, the same nominal EITC has more value 
in lagging regions that typically have lower costs of living.  A basic income allowance for households in 
lagging regions also has merit, although that and the other enhanced subsidies to household in these 
                                                                        
71 Dickert-Conlin, Stacy and Douglas Holtz-Eakin. 2000. ‘Employee-Based versus Employer-Based Subsidies to Low-Wage 
Workers: A Public Finance Perspective.” In Finding Jobs: Work and Welfare Reform. Edited by David E. Card and Rebecca M. 
Blank. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Pp 262-94. 
72 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2019. A Roadmap to Reducing Child Poverty. Washington, DC: 
The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25246. See also, The Economist. 2019. Special Report: Poverty in 
America September 28. 
73 Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2018. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st 
Century America.”  Brookings Papers on Economics Activity. Spring pp. 151-255. See page 157.  
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regions may introduce undesirable economic incentives and can be fraught with administrative and legal 
complexities.74  
  
                                                                        
74 Paying a basic income to disadvantaged populations in particular lagging regions may cause migration of people to those 
regions.  Length of residency qualifications can be imposed on programs, but in some cases, these are challenged on 
constitutional (equal protection) grounds.  See Van Parijs, Phillippe and Yannick Vanderborght. 2017. Basic Income: A Radical 
Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy.  Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.  See paperback edition 2019, 
Chapter 6 pages 133-145.   
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